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Abstract 
This article studies how prior exposure and individual respondent’s work attitudes affect the 
degree to which corruption is perceived as an obstacle to business operations. Survey 
questions about sensitive topics like corruption are susceptible to answer bias, for which we 
control by implementing a randomised response technique. The results suggest that 
corruption tends to be under-reported. Individuals who are more dedicated to their work 
report corruption as a bigger obstacle. So did respondents who were previously exposed to 
corruption. This effect becomes significantly stronger once we control for endogeneity issues 
related to answer bias that affects past experiences with corruption over and above answer 
bias that affects reports of corruption as an obstacle to business operations. We find that 
individual experiences, in addition to contextual variables, shape corruption data available 
from surveys. 
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HOW MUCH OF A NUISANCE IS GREASING THE PALMS? A STUDY ON JOB 
DEDICATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS CORRUPTION REPORTS UNDER 
ANSWER BIAS CONTROL 
The adverse effects of corruption on both the entire economy and on firms that are 
required to pay bribes are well documented (Jain, 2002; Jensen, Li, & Rahman, 2010a; Serra, 
2006). Evidence shows that not only certain countries, but also industries and types of firms are 
more exposed to corruption than others (Clarke, 2011b; Jensen, Li, & Rahman, 2010b; 
Svensson, 2003). However, even in highly corrupt environments not everybody engages in 
corruption, is exposed to it or even perceives it as an obstacle. The fight against corruption 
requires knowledge about the individuals involved. While a lot is known about the contextual 
factors explaining corruption, little is known about the individuals that pay bribes. Corruption 
can only exist if people are willing to engage in it. Hence, we are interested in the perception 
of corruption as an obstacle to business operations of the person that is exposed to it.  
The present study analyses business leaders and their experience with government 
corruption. We propose that whether corruption is viewed as an obstacle depends on several 
factors that are specific to the respondent. These are the respondent’s prior experience with 
corruption and work-attitude. We expect that these factors are relevant over and above the 
organisational and environmental context. Understanding the conditions under which 
corruption is perceived as an obstacle is a precondition for the acceptance of systemic 
changes for which wider business climate reforms aim (Jain, 2002). 
This paper’s contribution to the literature will be threefold. First, we will provide a multi-
layered perspective on corruption. Aside from contextual factors, we include the 
respondent’s prior exposure to corruption and individual work attitudes to predict the 
perception of corruption as an obstacle to doing business. Second, field research on 
corruption often faces a major impediment. It relies on corruption data that is self-reported, 
which may suffer from answer biases (Coutts & Jann, 2008). Respondents are unlikely to admit 
engaging in sensitive behaviours. To address this issue the present paper will control for 
possible survey response bias by a randomised response technique. We use this method not 
only to control for bias affecting the key variable of interest, but also to control for possible 
measurement bias affecting prior exposure to corruption as a key independent, yet 
endogenous variable. Third, aside from a handful exceptions (Thau, Derfler-Rozin, Pitesa, 
Mitchell, & Pillutla, 2014; Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010), very few studies have looked 
into individual employees’ attitudes towards unethical behaviour that is potentially beneficial 
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for the organisation. Investigating the role of work dedication in this context, will contribute to 
a relatively novel field of research. 
What explains attitudes towards corruption? 
We explore when corruption is perceived as an obstacle for business operations. The 
bulk of the literature focuses on contextual factors at the country and firm level. We will argue 
that individual effects such as prior exposure to corruption and the dedication of the 
respondent crucially matter for how corruption is perceived. 
What do we mean by “corruption”? According to common definitions (e.g., Miriam 
Webster online), corruption is described as dishonest or illegal behaviour by someone in 
power (e.g., government officials), directed at another person for personal gain (e.g., 
bribes).1
Hence environmental factors that shape power-relationships will also influence the 
likelihood of corruption. Many economic studies focus on such contextual factors. For 
instance, country level evidence shows that corruption is lower in wealthier, more democratic 
societies, whereas political instability increases the levels of corruption. In addition, corruption 
tends to be higher in rural areas in which government officials are harder to supervise than in 
urban areas with a more developed institutional infrastructure (Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012; 
Serra, 2006). These country level findings are complemented by firm attributes which have 
also been associated with corruption. For instance, larger firms pay bribes not only more 
often, but the bribes are also higher in their amount compared to smaller firms. The same 
holds for younger firms relative to older firms. Exporting firms are more likely to be exposed to 
corruption than firms that serve the local market, and firms that are foreign and/or privately 
owned have been reported to pay fewer and less bribes than state-owned enterprises 
(Clarke, 2011b; Jensen et al., 2010b; Svensson, 2003). 
 Academic definitions similarly stress the power-misuse element of corruption 
(Bendahan, Zehnder, Pralong, & Antonakis, 2014a). 
In addition to contextual factors, we assume that the perception of corruption as an 
obstacle differs across respondents. We argue that it is likely that a person’s opinion about 
corruption as an obstacle to business operations depends on their prior exposure to 
corruption. This idea originates in the behaviour-to-attitude link, which has been a long 
standing strand of research in social psychology (Holland, Verplanken, & Van Knippenberg, 
                                                     
1 See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruption, retrieved on 27 Dec. 14. 
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2002; Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1980). It is generally accepted that attitudes might not only 
guide future behaviour, but can also be inferred from past behaviour. This mechanism can be 
found in the area of corruption (Lee & Guven, 2013). In a study investigating attitudes towards 
corruption in over 20 countries, they found that past experience with bribery predicted how 
people perceived bribery. People who had in the past been offered or requested bribes also 
perceive bribes as more justified than people who had not. Then again, one may assume 
that perceiving bribes as justified equates to perceiving bribes as not harmful and therefore 
not as an obstacle to business operations. Hence, this results goes against the notion that 
exposure to bribery might have a revealing effect on the perceptions of the related costs. 
When it comes to assessing exposure to corruption outside the laboratory, most studies 
use survey data (Bendahan, Zehnder, Pralong, & Antonakis, 2014b; Lee & Guven, 2013). 
Corruption questions are typically embedded in business climate surveys that aim at 
generating estimates of the impact of corruption. This concerns the differences in the effect 
of corruption on firms, industries and countries. However, relying on survey data has 
drawbacks. Corrupt behaviour can be a highly sensitive issue, which is why respondents may 
not answer survey questions truthfully (Coutts & Jann, 2008). False responses and non-
responses are indeed a critical source of bias in corruption data (Jensen et al., 2010b). 
Estimates suggest that survey responses underreport the commission of sensitive acts by 45% 
on average (Lensvelt-Mulders, 2005). 
The third factor that will be looked at to explain the perception of corruption as an 
obstacle to business operations are the individual work attitudes of the respondent. This study 
links corruption to ‘work engagement’, a key psychological characteristic of the manager 
(Christian, Garza, & Slaughter, 2011; Kahn, 1990). Personal work engagement describes a 
state in which employees “bring in” their personal selves during work role performances, 
investing personal energy and experiencing an emotional connection with their work 
(Christian et al., 2011; Kahn, 1990). Even though work dedication has been linked to various 
attitudes related to doing business, nothing is yet known about how of work engagement 
interacts with corruption and whether more dedicated respondents would see corruption 
more or less as an obstacle. Two different predictions can be made. 
For one, giving in to corrupt demands of tax officials, or even offering bribes, could be 
seen as a particular form of extra-role pro-organisational behaviour, as “unethical pro-
organisational behaviour” (Thau et al., 2014; Umphress et al., 2010). Different to other 
unethical behaviour, giving in to or committing corrupt acts may be directed at the 
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organisational good. People who are highly engaged in their job are also more willing to go 
the extra mile for their organisation to ‘gets things done’ (Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002; 
Jensen & Rahman, 2011; Rich, Lepine, & Crawford, 2010; Xanthopoulou, Bakker, Demerouti, & 
Schaufeli, 2009). Hence, more dedicated respondents might be more likely to respond to 
corrupt demands for the benefit of their business. Empirical evidence points into this direction 
(Umphress et al., 2010). They find that people who highly identify with their organisation were 
more likely to engage in unethical pro-organisational behaviour. In this case, corruption 
would be an alternative route towards organisationally beneficial outcomes. More 
dedicated respondents would be less likely to perceive corruption as particular obstacle. 
Then again, work-dedication may partly capture of job satisfaction, which was found to 
be negatively related to unethical behaviour (for a meta-study see (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & 
Treviño, 2010). If this is the case, more dedicated respondents might perceive a corrupt 
environment, i.e. a culture of bribery and corruption, more as an obstacle rather than as an 
additional route to ‘get things done’. 
The present study 
This study investigates the effect of context, exposure and work dedication on 
corruption attitude. We use representative data from two establishment level surveys 
conducted in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh by the World Bank in 2011. These samples provide a 
unique opportunity to study the link between work engagement and corruption in a 
developing country context.  Both surveys included on individual work engagement in the 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys, and either country provides a viable setting for corruption 
studies. The investment climate in both countries suffers from corruption, which provides 
viable setting for corruption studies. For instance, Transparency International rankings confirm 
the notion that the public sector in either country both is highly corrupt. In Transparency’s 
2013 Corruption Perceptions Index, corruption values are assigned to 175 countries and 
territories, ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). With a score of 27, Bangladesh 
was ranked 136th, while Sri Lanka’s ranking was slightly better (91), its score of 37 was similarly 
low. 
One of the difficulties of measuring corruption in surveys is that questions about 
corrupt behaviour are susceptible to answer bias. Respondents may be reluctant or unwilling 
to answer sensitive questions, and if they do, they might not answer truthfully. Using such 
information in regressions is therefore problematic. The estimated coefficients may be 
– 7 – 
  
distorted, which needs to be controlled for in order to obtain reliable regression results (Coutts 
& Jann, 2008; Jensen & Rahman, 2011). 
The survey implemented a forced response variant of a random response method, 
originally designed to incentivise survey respondents to answer specific sensitive questions 
truthfully (Warner, 1965), to identify answer bias. The presently implemented method was 
proposed by (Azfar & Murrell, 2009) to capture possible answer bias (see below for a 
description in greater detail). It has been used to show that answer bias affects sensitive 
questions, particularly referring to corruption and performance (Azfar & Murrell, 2009; Clarke, 
2011b, 2012; T. Clausen, Fagerberg, & Gulbrandsen, 2012; Friesenbichler, Clarke, & Wong, 
2014; Jensen & Rahman, 2011). 
The novelty of this paper is threefold. First, we consider work dedication as an 
explanatory factor for reported corruption as a business obstacle. Second, we use the 
dataset to construct a variable indicating prior exposure to corruption, which to the 
knowledge of the authors is new to the corruption literature. Third, the data offers a bias 
control method that has been established in the literature. The bias control method is not 
applied directly on the corruption variable, but is used to construct a proxy for external 
factors that serve as instrumental variables capturing measurement bias of the variable for 
prior exposure to corruption. 
Method 
That survey covers 588 establishments in Sri Lanka and 1,001 establishments in 
Bangladesh. Establishments were selected according to a stratified random sampling 
strategy. The stratification considered i) firm size classes (micro: 1-5, small: 6-19, medium: 20-
99, large: >99; large firms were oversampled), ii) regions at the district level, and iii) ISIC Rev. 
3.1, 2-digit industries. The sample included all manufacturing sectors according to the 
classifications of ISIC Rev. 3.1 (group D), construction (group F), Services (groups G and H), 
transportation, storage and communications (group I), and Information technology (sub-
sector 72 in group K). Further information about the implementation, the sampling 
methodology and the datasets are available from the World Bank on the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Survey website.2
                                                     
2 See 
 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org, retrieved on 27 Dec. 14.  
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The questions were answered by senior officials of the establishment, who could have 
been the owner, the CEO or a senior employee. Some surveys were answered by more than 
one person. These were excluded from subsequent analysis, leaving a total of 1,737 
observations of which 982 were in Bangladesh and 755 in Sri Lanka. Most respondents were 
male – only 14.2% in Sri Lanka and 1.5% in Bangladesh were female. In Sri Lanka, 45.8% of the 
respondents owned the establishment, 40.6% were CEOs and 13.6% were other senior 
employees. In Bangladesh, 24.8% of the respondents were owners, 60% were answered by 
CEOs and 15.2% by senior employees. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the degree to which corruption is perceived as an obstacle 
to their establishment’s operations. The interviewer listed factors that can affect the current 
operations. Among other factors, respondents were asked to rate corruption as such an 
obstacle. The choices given were No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Moderate Obstacle, a 
Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle. 
Exposure to corruption 
The implemented questionnaire did not contain a direct question whether 
respondents have had prior exposure to corruption. We therefore use answers on three 
different items to construct a dummy variable indicating respondents’ prior experience with 
corruption. These items measure corruption at an increasing degree of sensitivity. Two 
questions refer to requests for informal payments and one question concerns the expected 
amount of the informal indicating.  
The first question was only posed to respondents that were visited by a tax official. It 
asked if in any of the inspections or meetings a gift or informal payment was expected or 
requested. The second question was posed to respondents that have not been visited by a 
tax official. It asked such requests are typically made. 
The third, rather general item used to construct the exposure variable asked 
respondents to quantify the amount that establishments “like this one pay in informal 
payments or gifts to public officials”. The underlying act can refer to various types of 
interaction with government officials, such as customs, taxes, licenses, regulations or services. 
We assume that respondents who provide figures were actually making informal payments at 
some stage.  
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For each of these three items we create yes-no variables, which we use to construct a 
dummy for exposure to corruption. If a respondent answers any of these three questions with 
yes, we label her to have had prior exposure to corruption. Also, labels for missing values were 
generated for respondents who did not answer any of these questions. In total 10% of the 
respondents indicated to have been exposed to corruption in the one or other way. 
Work dedication 
To measure work dedication, the survey used a sub-scale of the Utrecht Work 
Engagement Scale (Schaufeli, Bakker, & Salanova, 2006). Respondents were asked to answer 
how often they experience a given state on a Likert-scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 
(always). For instance, one question of the five-item scale is “I find the work that I do full of 
meaning and purpose“. Table 1 lists The internal consistency of this scale was good, with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Individual and contextual variables 
Position of respondent in firm. These are dummy variables that denote whether the 
respondent is the CEO or a senior employee of the firm. The group of firm owners served as 
the comparison category. 
Gender. A dummy variable denotes a female respondent. 
Firm age. This variable is defined as the survey year minus the year the establishment began 
its operations. 
Size. The number of employees in full time equivalents (in nat. logs).  
Export. A dummy variable denotes whether firms export either directly or indirectly (i.e., sold 
domestically to third party that exports products). 
Family business. Constructing an ownership variable would have reduced the sample size 
significantly, because ownership information was only available for 498 of the 1,837 
observations. However, we were able to construct a dummy denoting if a firm is a family 
business, which were identified by the question ‘Does this establishment rely on one or more 
family members in decision-making?’. This indicates if firms that are strongly embedded in 
their respective locality. 
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Country. A dummy variable denotes firms that are in Sri Lanka. 
Industry. A dummy variable denotes manufacturing and trade (retail or wholesale) firms. 
 
Table 2 about here 
Identifying answer bias 
We used data from a forced response variant of a random response technique 
(Warner, 1965), as proposed by (Azfar & Murrell, 2009) to capture possible answer bias in the 
present sample.3
(Azfar & Murrell, 2009) proposed this procedure to identify respondents that did not 
answer sensitive questions truthfully. To do so, one needs to specify an “angel assumption”, 
describing the situation in which no-one would commit any of the acts in question. Then the 
expected number of no’s can be derived from a binomial distribution with seven coin tosses 
as the events, a 50% probability of success for each coin toss, and the respective number of 
successful cases. Put differently, even if respondents never committed any of the acts 
described (and report the outcome of the coin-throw truthfully), they would still report a 
number of “yeses” (for the number of heads they throw). The likelihood that not a single head 
would show up in seven coin tosses is below one in a hundred (in addition to the likelihood 
that someone never committed any of these acts). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of 
 These randomised questions were delivered towards the end of the survey 
to reduce the likelihood that answers to other questions are affected. In the present 
application, the interviewer asks a respondent ten sensitive questions unrelated to corruption 
(e.g., “Have you ever inappropriately hired a staff member for personal reasons?”). The 
respondent is asked to toss a coin out of sight of the interviewer. If the coin shows heads the 
respondent is required to answer ‘yes’. If the coin shows tails, the respondent is supposed to 
answer the question truthfully. If the respondent answers ‘yes’, no one (not even the 
interviewer), knows whether the respondent is saying that he or she really committed the 
sensitive act or just that the coin showed heads. This is thought to encourage truthful answers 
and reduce underreporting of sensitive behaviours (Lensvelt-Mulders, 2005). To give these 
respondents a chance to answer ‘yes’ without losing face, three less sensitive random 
response questions were included. These were dropped in the present application, so that 
the total number of responses used is seven (Azfar & Murrell, 2009). 
                                                     
3 The present description of the method draws Azfar and Murrell (2009) and Clausen and others (2010), which provide 
greater detail on the methodology.  
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responses that would occur under the angle assumption and compares it to the actual 
distribution of negative responses. As can be seen, 12% of the respondents of the present 
sample reported seven no’s, considerably more than would be expected under the angel 
assumption. It is therefore likely that some of those respondents did not answer other 
questions truthfully (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 about here  
 
Besides following the instructions and answering truthfully, there are several answer 
strategies respondents might pursue. For instance, even though the respondent knows that 
the interviewer will not know why they are giving a positive answer (either because the coin 
showed heads or because they have done the act) some respondents may choose to 
answer ‘no’ even when the coin shows heads. In this regard the present data corresponds to 
previous findings (Azfar & Murrell, 2009; B. Clausen, Kraay, & Murrell, 2010) that show an 
implausibly high number of ‘no’ answers to the sensitive random response questions. If the 
questions would have been answered truthfully and if no one has committed any of the 
sensitive acts, half of the respondents should answer ‘no’ to the sensitive questions (see Figure 
1 for the sum of no’s). 
Some respondents may show sophisticated answer behaviour, and seek to avoid long 
and unlikely sequences of ‘no’. To give these respondents a chance to answer ‘yes’ without 
losing face, three less sensitive random response questions were included. Following (Azfar & 
Murrell, 2009), we exclude these questions when calculating the answer bias index. This is 
methodologically corroborated by (Edgell, Himmelfarb, & Duchan, 1982) who find that 
forced response method work relatively better with moderately sensitive questions to which 
most people that are expected to give a positive answer (unreported results, however, show 
that including these questions does not qualitatively affect the obtained results). 
There may be bias also on the other side of the distribution, i.e. the number of positive 
responses. Assuming that respondents answer truthfully, it is likely that some respondents have 
committed the sensitive acts. However, some may answer strategically and over-report, i.e. 
give positive answers when they should answer no. It is not possible to identify those 
respondents, since there is no information about the actual conduct. This bias seems to be 
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less relevant, however. Only few respondents answered all (2.5%), or all but one (4.6%) 
questions with a yes. 
We use data from the random-response technique to create a variable indicating 
“answer bias”. To do so we calculate the sum of negative answers as a measure of the 
likelihood that a respondent misreports. In other words, respondents with a higher sum of 
negative answers are more likely to show answer bias (Friesenbichler et al., 2014). 
Estimation strategy 
We use regression analysis to examine how individual characteristics affect reports of 
corruption as a factor that hampers businesses operations. The key variables are 1) business 
context, 2) job dedication, and 3) prior exposure to corruption. These variables are used in 
the first regression. In the second regression, we use the individual characteristics and the 
contextual setting as control variables. The next two estimations use the same variables as the 
previous ones, but are estimated as ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. This 
method serves as a robustness check that controls for possible distortions of OLS coefficients 
due to the data structure. The regression outcome is not continuous, but an ordinal variable 
ranging from 0 (no obstacle) to four (severe obstacle).  
These regressions control for answer bias that affects the reported severity of 
corruption as an obstacle for business operations. However, also the variable that indicates 
whether respondents have been exposed to corruption might be distorted. This introduces an 
endogeneity problem due to measurement bias, which we seek to control for with an 
instrumental variable estimation that can recover causal parameters (Antonakis, Bendahan, 
Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). 
The idea is to use an external factor, an instrumental variable, that affects the 
endogenous variable (i.e. prior exposure to corruption) but not the dependent variable 
‘corruption as an obstacle’. The instrumental variables purge the coefficient of reported 
exposure to corruption from possible answer bias. We use a two-stage-least-squares estimator 
(2SLS). In the first stage, we predict the values of the endogenous variable using all other 
explanatory variables over and above the instrumental variables. In the second stage, we re-
estimate the equation of interest, using the predicted values of the endogenous variable. 
How do we identify instrumental variables that affect reported exposure to corruption, 
but not corruption as an obstacle? It is likely that the bias is larger for the exposure variable, 
since the questions that were used to construct the exposure indicator are more sensitive. 
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While the dependent variable is a general question, the exposure variable concerns the 
respondent directly, which is likely to trigger a greater degree of answer bias. This notion is 
confirmed by missing values. Survey respondents may choose non-response as an answer 
strategy when questions are sensitive(Jensen et al., 2010a). This implies that more sensitive 
questions have a higher non-response rate. If both questions were equally sensitive, the share 
of missing reports should be the same. However, only 2.46% did not rate the severity of 
corruption as an obstacle to their business operations, while 13.07% did not provide sufficient 
information to construct the exposure variable. We seek to exploit these differences in the 
sensitivity of the underlying questions to construct instrumental variables. 
Why can we not simply use the indicator for answer bias from the previous 
regressions? One may assume that the indicator for answer bias also affects the endogenous 
variable ‘prior exposure to corruption’, perhaps to a different degree. By definition, the 
instrumental variable must only affect the endogenous variable and needs to be 
independent from the regressand. Hence we cannot simply use the answer bias indicator as 
an instrument. While this procedure produces qualitatively comparable results with the 
estimation that we ultimately chose, this procedure is indeed rejected by exogeneity tests.4
Hence we use the data generated by random response technique to create two 
instrumental variables measuring answer tendencies that do not consider the individual 
respondents’ answer. The method therefore shifts the focus from self-reported data towards 
contextual factors. It is also conceivable that these external factors also affect the answer 
bias. While using the instrumental variables described below on the answer bias indicator is 
statistically viable, the results remain qualitatively the same, however. 
 
The first instrument used reflects the interviewer’s influence on respondent’s answering 
behaviour. Although the quality of the data ultimately depends on the truthfulness of the 
respondent, it also depends on the competence of the interviewer to create an atmosphere 
of trust that allows for that. Also, some interviewers may have had respondents that were 
systemically more truthful than others (although there is no reason to believe in inter-individual 
variations in truthfulness). We are able to identify the respondents interviewed by a specific 
interviewer via the interviewer code that is available in the dataset. We then compute 
interviewer-level measures of answer bias that is external to the respondent. That is, we 
                                                     
4 It is also conceivable that such measurement bias affects the answer bias indicator itself. Treating the answer bias 
as an endogenous variable with the same instruments, we obtain statistically viable results, which however do not 
qualitatively change the results obtained from the OLS and ordered logit regressions. 
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calculate the average number of negative answers that an interviewer obtains, but leave 
out the present observation. The data was collected by 114 interviewers who on average 
conducted 15.2 interviews, with median of 8.5 interviews and a variance 11.3. 
The second instrumental variable captures regional effects. Some regions are likely to 
be less reticent than others, reflecting unobserved institutional and cultural differences. 
Again, we omit the respondent’s own answer and compute a leave-out-mean of the 
negative answers at the regional level. This value does not include the respondent’s answer, 
and therefore captures regional characteristics rather than the respondent’s. The dataset 
covers a total of 13 regions, of which four were in Bangladesh and nine in Sri Lanka. 
If there were no interviewer and region specific effects, there should be no variance 
across either dimension. However, both variables show a considerable amount of variance. 
The mean of the regional indicator is 4.17, with a standard deviation of 0.50, ranging from 
2.44 to 5.47. The mean for the instrument reflecting the interviewer’s competence is 4.17, with 
a standard deviation of 0.82, ranging from 1.8 to 7. 
Estimation results  
Three different types of regression estimations (OLS, ordered logit and 2SLS) are used to 
examine how individual characteristics and exposure affects reports of corruption as a factor 
that hampers businesses operations. All analyses include answer bias as one of the predictor 
variables. For both the OLS and the ordered logit regression, we present two specifications. 
First we estimate the unconditional effect of job dedication, prior experiences and answer 
bias on corruption as a perceived obstacle to business operations. We do not consider the 
specific context. In a second regression, we then add control variables, considering the role 
of environmental factors. These context variables were also used in the 2SLS regression. 
The results from all estimated regressions confirm the notion that more dedicated 
respondents are more likely to report corruption as a severe problem. This effect becomes 
bigger when the firm and individual level control variables are added. In line with previous 
research (Azfar & Murrell, 2009; B. Clausen et al., 2010), we find a negative effect of the 
answer bias indicator on corruption reports, suggesting that respondents who are likely to 
have an answer bias are less likely to see corruption as an obstacle (see Table 3). Over and 
above the respondent’s job dedication and individual answer bias, prior exposure to 
corruption of the respondent has a positive and significant effect on seeing corruption as an 
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obstacle to business operations. The effect for prior exposure is larger than the effects for work 
dedication or answer bias.  
 
Table 3 about here  
 
The results for the control variables are in line with our expectations. Respondents in Sri 
Lanka were less likely to report corruption as an obstacle than those in Bangladesh. Exporting 
firms are associated with perceptions of corruption as a greater obstacle firms that serve only 
the local market. Respondents in older firms report corruption as a bigger obstacle. 
Compared to owners, CEOs and senior employees perceive corruption as a lesser issue. 
Controlling for endogeneity 
However, also the variable ‘prior exposure to corruption’ is susceptible to answer bias. 
The estimates of the 2SLS regression control for this, using answer tendencies specific to both 
region and interviewer as external determinants of the exposure variable. The picture 
changes insofar that the coefficient for prior exposure to corruption now dwarfs the effect of 
the other variables. This indicates that individual experiences with corruption shape much of 
the corruption data that is available from surveys once answer bias is taken into account. 
Both instrumental variables used are statistically significant with negative coefficients, which 
again indicate an under-reporting of prior exposure to corruption. 
While dedicated managers are less likely to be exposed to corruption, they are more 
likely to report corruption as an obstacle. In addition, the coefficient for answer bias in the 
second stage regression turns insignificant. This is plausible, since the questions used to 
construct the variable exposure are likely to be more sensitive than the general question 
about corruption as a business obstacle. The effect of the re-estimated values of prior 
exposure, i.e. the values that have been purged from answer bias, is likely to override the 
effect of answer bias that applies to the general question. 
The post-estimation statistics confirm the validity of the instrumental variable 
regression. We reject the null hypothesis that exposure is exogenous (p-value: 0.003). The 
instruments seem to be sufficiently strong, i.e. they affect the endogenous variable. The 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is significant (p-value: 0.003). A Hansen-J test indicates that the 
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instrumental variables used are sufficiently exogenous (p-value: 0.753), i.e. we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments do not affect the dependent variable. 
Interestingly, the effects of some control variables changed in the instrumental variable 
approach. For instance, initial results showed that CEOs perceived corruption as a lesser issue. 
However, this effect disappeared in the instrumental variable estimation. This indicates that 
owners are less likely to be exposed to corruption than others, and once this is controlled for, 
the differences in corruption reports between the respondents’ positions in the firm disappear. 
The same effect is obtained for firm age – when controlling for exposure, respondents in older 
firms are not more likely to report corruption as a larger obstacle. The statistically significant 
effects that OLS regressions find vanish once differences in prior exposure to corruption are 
being controlled for.  
Discussion and conclusions 
This paper analysed individual characteristics that may affect reports about the severity 
of corruption. While corruption reports have been linked to contextual factors, not all 
respondents in corrupt environments engage in corrupt behaviour. We study the effect of 
work dedication and prior experiences with corruption on the perception of corruption as an 
obstacle to business operations. Since corruption is illegal and might be perceived as 
unethical by some respondents, questions about corruption are sensitive. Respondents may 
be reluctant or unwilling to answer, and if they do, they might not answer truthfully. Cognisant 
of possible answer bias from which sensitive survey questions suffer, we used data from a 
random response technique as a control. We used various regression techniques on survey 
data provided by the World Bank which was collected in 2011 in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 
Both countries pose a viable environment to study corruption. 
We find that individual as well as context characteristics play a role in how corruption 
is perceived, but that prior exposure has the biggest influence. The results indicate that 
respondents who are more dedicated to their job criticise corruption as a bigger obstacle 
than others. Although giving in to corruption and bribery request might be a way to get things 
done and constitute an unethical pro-organisational behaviour in that sense (Umphress et al., 
2010), it is still perceived as an obstacle. 
The largest explanatory factor appeared to be past experiences with corruption. We 
expected that prior exposure also influences respondents’ attitude towards corruption. We 
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use of indicator for prior exposure as a predictor of the attitude towards corruption, which 
differs from previous economic corruption literature that considers answer bias, but treats 
these two factors as independent from each other. According to social-psychological 
understanding this assumption would not be correct. Rather, exposure and experience with 
certain behaviours is likely to have a major influence on people’s attitude towards them. Our 
results confirm this - prior exposure increases the perception of corruption as an obstacle to 
operations. Although previous findings (Lee & Guven, 2013) indicate that in cultures with more 
exposure to corruption paying bribes is generally perceived as more justified, we find that 
even if corruption in a country is high, it is still perceived as an obstacle, even more so if 
people are more exposed to it. 
This study therefore not only adds to economic corruption literature by considering 
prior exposure to corruption, but adds to previous research on exposure to corruption (Lee & 
Guven, 2013) by controlling for possible answer bias. This answer bias might come from issues 
concerning measuring corruption. Possible bias affects both ‘corruption as an obstacle to 
business operations’ and ‘exposure to corruption’. Corruption is likely to be underreported, 
because people might be hesitant to admit that they have been exposed to a bribery 
request, or are familiar with corruption at all (Kundt, Misch, & Nerré, 2013).  
To control for answer bias, the survey employed a randomised response technique 
that allowed us to identify records with a likely answer bias. We constructed an indicator that 
controlled for answer bias in the reports about the severity of corruption as an obstacle to 
business operations. The results confirmed previous findings that corruption is on average 
underreported. However, also the explanatory variable that measures prior exposure to 
corruption might suffer from an answer bias, which leads to statistical challenges. We 
implemented a 2SLS regression to purge the coefficient for previous exposure from possible 
bias over and above answer bias that affected the attitudes about corruption itself. 
By definition, instrumental variables need to be uncorrelated with the dependent 
variable (perceptions of corruption as an obstacle), but determine the endogenous variable 
(reported prior exposure to corruption). However, both of these variables are likely to be 
affected by an answer bias, which was empirically approximated by the indicator based on 
the random response technique. To identify a viable instrumentation strategy, we draw on 
differences in the sensitivity of the underlying questions. Prior exposure possibly concerns 
sensitive, personal behaviour. Hence it seems that ‘prior exposure’ is more susceptible to 
answer bias than the general question about ‘corruption as an obstacle to business 
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operations’. Exploring these differences to control for endogeneity issues, we argued that the 
competences of interviewers and regional response characteristics identify differences in the 
answer bias itself. This causes non-random measurement error and results in an endogeneity 
problem. In a 2SLS regression, we used leave-out-averages of the answer bias indicator at the 
interviewer and the regional level as instrumental variables. After controlling for answer bias in 
the variable ‘prior exposure to corruption’, its effect becomes much larger, and also over-
rides the effect for answer bias concerning the dependent variable. 
The 2SLS shows the relationship of work dedication with both exposure to corruption 
and reports of corruption as an obstacle. Dedicated managers are less likely to be exposed 
to corruption, which may suggest that they are less likely to pay bribes. At the same time, 
they are more likely to report corruption as an obstacle. This may suggest that more 
dedicated managers are less likely to volunteer bribes, and might be more concerned about 
the consequences of getting caught. This not only shows that corruption is a problem to both 
firms that pay and firms that do not pay bribes, but also contrasts the notion that engaged 
managers might not be willing to go the ‘extra mile to get things done’. 
Controlling for the context of the interview produced the expected results. Respondents 
in Sri Lanka were less likely to report corruption as an obstacle than those in Bangladesh, 
which also reflects their respective standing on the 2013 world corruption index by 
Transparency International.5
Interestingly, the effects of some control variables changed in the instrumental variable 
approach. For instance, initial results showed that CEOs and senior employees perceived 
corruption as a lesser issue. However, this effect disappeared in the instrumental variable 
estimation. This indicates that owners are more likely to be exposed to corruption than others, 
and once this is controlled for, the differences in corruption reports between the respondents’ 
positions in the firm disappear. The same effect is obtained for firm age – when controlling for 
exposure, respondents in older firms are not more likely to report corruption as a larger 
obstacle. 
 Exporting firms are associated with perceptions of corruption as 
a greater obstacle than firms that serve only the local market. Respondents in older firms 
report corruption as a bigger obstacle. 
Certainly, there are also a number of limitations to the present findings. We are aware 
that by looking at dedication and exposure as predictors of whether corruption is an 
                                                     
5 See http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results.  
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obstacle, we only illuminate cornerstones of a multidimensional process. Still, our study shows 
that including aspects such as individual respondent’s attitudes and his or her prior exposure 
play an important role in people’s attitudes towards corruption. Future studies might want to 
explore the limits and conditions of these relationships. A second limitation of this study 
concerns the measurement of corruption as a reported obstacle, which was captured by a 
single item measure only. While this allowed for a general estimate of how people think about 
the corruption, it does not inform about the specific areas affected by it. A more detailed 
enquiry into the multifaceted phenomenon of corruption would be an important way 
forward. Eventually, it needs to be pointed out that the present results stem from a single 
measurement occasion only. In this sense, conclusions about causality in the present study 
cannot be made using differences over time. We confront this limitation by applying 
instrumental variable regressions for the relationship between perceived corruption and prior 
exposure. In addition, we control for answer bias, and use two different country samples to 
illustrate the robustness of our findings. 
Practical implications and future research 
The finding that prior exposure to corruption affects the perception of corruption as an 
obstacle has practical implications. It seems that exposure to corruption is a bigger issue than 
a straightforward analysis of survey data would suggest. Respondents underreport corruption, 
especially exposure to it, to a substantial degree, thereby generating bias in the corruption 
data. The reported randomised response technique might be one way to control for that. 
Respondents that report not being exposed to corruption perceive corruption as a less severe 
obstacle. This might indicate that non-exposure leads to an unrealistically low perception of 
corruption as an obstacle for the overall economy. 
In addition, the results show that corruption seems to be a large obstacle for those 
who are highly dedicated to their job. Given that dedication is indicative for individual and 
business performance, it is conceivable that corruption seems to asymmetrically affect firms 
with more productive, growth oriented firms affected more than others. Those firms might 
benefit most from action undertake towards reducing corruption.  
Our findings are also relevant to other researchers interested in survey data on sensitive 
issues. In the present article, we illustrate how answer biases on sensitive issues can be 
detected and then used to control for endogeneity issues stemming from measurement errors 
affecting the sensitive variable of interest - in our case, ‘prior exposure to corruption’. The idea 
was to purge coefficients from bias affecting the variable ‘prior exposure’, thereby obtaining 
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a more reliable estimate of corruption as a perceived obstacle. The more exposure in the 
past, the higher corruption as a perceived obstacle becomes. This finding points at a self-
enforcing process. However, similar feedback effects are conceivable for work attitudes. The 
present results from the instrumental variable regression point into this direction. While job 
dedication is negatively related to exposure to corruption in the first stage, it remains 
positively associated with the perception of corruption as an obstacle in the second stage. 
We hope our contribution encourages researchers to study the repeated effect of corruption 
on work attitudes over time. 
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Table 1 – Work dedication scale 
 
Note: This table provides the descriptive statistics for the questions used in the Utrecht work 
engagement scale (Schaufeli et al., 2006), own calculations. 
 
Question Mean Std. Dev.
I find the work that I do full of meaning and purpose. 5.59 1.18
I am enthusiastic about my job. 5.35 1.15
My job inspires me. 5.22 1.18
I am proud of the work that I do. 5.22 1.20
To me, my job is challenging. 4.78 1.50
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Note: This table provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used. Gender, owner, CEO, employee, family business, 
export, manufacturing, urban and Sri Lanka are dichotomous; * p<0.05 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Corruption (0-4) 1.84 1.41 1.00
2 Work dedication 5.23 0.94 0.02 1.00
3 Exposure 0.10 0.31 0.08* -0.07* 1.00
4 Answer Bias 4.17 1.76 -0.12* 0.01 -0.03 1.00
5 Gender 0.07 0.26 -0.13* 0.07* -0.02 0.02 1.00
6 Owner 0.33 0.47 -0.07* 0.05* 0.03 -0.07* -0.03 1.00
7 CEO 0.52 0.50 0.07* -0.05* -0.03 0.01 -0.06* -0.74* 1.00
8 Employee 0.15 0.35 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.07* 0.12* -0.29* -0.43* 1.00
9 Labour (ln) 2.96 1.23 -0.02 0.18* 0.12* -0.03 0.09* -0.19* 0.08* 0.14* 1.00
10 Age (ln) 2.52 0.78 -0.10* 0.03 0.07* -0.05 0.10* 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.19* 1.00
11 Family 0.38 0.49 -0.13* 0.01 0.07* -0.02 0.05* 0.10* -0.06* -0.06* -0.07* 0.06* 1.00
12 Export 0.16 0.36 -0.02 0.02 0.14* 0.04 0.08* -0.18* 0.06* 0.16* 0.31* -0.01 0.00 1.00
13 Manuf. 0.61 0.49 0.12* -0.16* 0.03 -0.08* -0.09* 0.18* -0.07* -0.14* -0.07* 0.08* 0.09* -0.09* 1.00
14 Urban 0.52 0.50 0.52* -0.22* 0.08* 0.03 -0.22* -0.28* 0.23* 0.05* -0.22* -0.22* -0.10* 0.02 0.19* 1.00
15 Sri Lanka 0.43 0.50 -0.61* 0.17* -0.05 0.06* 0.25* 0.22* -0.19* -0.02 0.10* 0.22* 0.15* 0.02 -0.26* -0.92* 1.00
Table 3 – Regression results – estimating reported severity of corruption 
 
Note: This table shows the regression results for the reported severity of corruption. The first two 
columns show OLS results, and columns (3) and (4) show results for the ordered logit 
regression. Both methods have been estimated with and without control variables. Column 
(5) and (6) show the results for the 2SLS estimation. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Constants are not reported; Pseudo R² for ordered 
logit regressions; centred R² for 2SLS regressions.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Corruption Corruption Corruption Corruption Exposure Corruption
Dedication 0.14** 0.28** 0.19** 0.53** -0.03** 0.37**
(0.041) (0.037) (0.053) (0.065) (0.010) (0.059)
Exposure 0.40** 0.41** 0.52** 0.84** 3.59*
(0.126) (0.117) (0.167) (0.198) (1.431)
Answer bias -0.09** -0.05** -0.11** -0.08* -0.00 -0.03
(0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.034) (0.006) (0.031)
Gender -0.05 0.09 0.06 -0.26
(0.139) (0.273) (0.056) (0.222)
CEO -0.16+ -0.21 -0.06** 0.07
(0.080) (0.141) (0.023) (0.146)
Employee -0.19 -0.26 -0.08* 0.08
(0.122) (0.203) (0.035) (0.211)
Lab (ln) 0.02 0.02 0.04** -0.10
(0.032) (0.056) (0.010) (0.071)
Firm age (ln) 0.09+ 0.16+ 0.03* 0.02
(0.048) (0.081) (0.013) (0.071)
Fam. Biz. -0.10 -0.05 0.04+ -0.26*
(0.073) (0.128) (0.021) (0.119)
Export (Dummy) -0.08 -0.20 0.12** -0.45*
(0.095) (0.151) (0.036) (0.208)
Manuf. (Dummy) -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.04
(0.083) (0.144) (0.023) (0.114)
Urban (Dummy) -0.21 -0.31 0.25** -0.77*
(0.128) (0.226) (0.044) (0.304)
Sri Lanka (Dummy) -2.09** -3.67** 0.18** -2.38**
(0.132) (0.279) (0.042) (0.219)
IV: Regional bias -0.04+
(0.023)
IV: Interviewer bias -0.03*
(0.015)
Observations 1,161 1,042 1,161 1,042 1,027 1,027
R-squared 0.03 0.42 0.01 0.17 0.09 -0.06
2SLSOrdered LogitOLS
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Figure 1 – Distribution of negative responses from the forced random response method 
 
Note: This figure shows the observed distribution of negative responses and the distribution 
that would have been expected according to the angel assumption (people have not 
committed these acts).  
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